I show that a unique equilibrium exists in an asymmetric two-player all-pay auction with a discrete signal structure, correlated signals, and interdependent valuations. The proof is constructive, and the construction can be implemented as a computer program and be used to derive comparative statics. I also characterize the set of equilibria when a reserve price is introduced.
Introduction
This paper investigates a contest model in which two asymmetric contestants compete for a prize by expending resources. Each contestant has some private information that may affect both contestants' valuation for the prize, and the contestants are asymmetric in that their private information may be drawn from an asymmetric joint distribution and impact their valuations differently. For example, consider a research and development race in which the firm that develops the higher-quality product enjoys a dominant market position. Each firm may be partially informed about market demand, which determines the value of a dominant market position. Thus, firms' information may not be statistically independent. The value of a dominant market position may differ between the firms, because the profit associated with such a position may depend on firm-specific characteristics such as production costs and marketing expertise. Similar interdependencies and asymmetries in information and valuations for the prize arise in rent-seeking scenarios, such as lobbying, and in other competitions with sunk investments, such as competitions for promotions.
I model the contest as an asymmetric all-pay auction that allows for correlated signals and interdependent valuations. Each player privately observes a signal drawn from a finite ordered set, and these sets may differ between the players. Each player then places a bid, both players pay their bids, and the player with the higher bid wins the prize. The value of the prize is a player-specific function of both players' signals.
This formulation includes many natural settings as special cases. Singleton signal sets correspond to a complete-information all-pay auction (Hillman and Riley (1989) ). Valuations that depend only on a player's own signal correspond to a private-value setting. Identical valuations correspond to a common-value setting. A singleton signal set for only one player corresponds to a setting with one informed player and one uninformed player (with possibly different valuations).
The main result of the paper is a constructive characterization of the unique equilibrium. The equilibrium is constructed in a finite number of steps by proceeding from higher bids to lower bids. Each step identifies a pair of signals, one for each player, and an interval of bids on which the players bid when they observe these signals. The bidding densities in the interval are closely related to the equilibrium bidding densities in a complete-information all-pay auction with valuations that correspond to the observed signals. The construction ends when one player exhausts his bidding probability. Any remaining bidding probability of the other player is expended by bidding 0.
In many special cases the construction can be used to derive equilibrium properties of economic interest or characterize the equilibrium in closed-form. This can be used to derive comparative statics and answer various questions about the value of information. Section 5 enumerates several such cases. To the extent that players' valuations and the distribution of their signals are controlled by a designer, the results may be useful for designing contests that maximize effort, efficiency, or some other target function.
The model can also be used as a building block in a dynamic setting in which players make investments or choose how much information to acquire before the contest takes place. The effect of these strategic decisions can be modeled as determining the distribution of players' signals and how the signals affect players' valuations. The equilibrium characterization can then be used to solve for players' optimal behavior in the first stage.
I also consider the effect of a reserve price, which corresponds to a minimum investment necessary to win the contest. A player who bids below the reserve price loses, regardless of what the other player bids. I show that the structure of any equilibrium with a reserve price is closely related to that of the unique equilibrium without a reserve price. In particular, there exists a bid such that in any equilibrium with a reserve price, players' bidding behavior above the reserve price is a "right shift" of their bidding behavior above this bid in the contest without a reserve price. The introduction of a reserve price may lead to multiple equilibria, which only differ in the probabilities that players bid 0 and the reserve price. I characterize the set of equilibria, which are payoff equivalent.
Relation to the Literature. The paper contributes to the large literature on perfectlydiscriminating contests, in which there is a deterministic relationship between players' investments and the identity of the winner. 1 Such contests can accommodate a large number of players and prizes and a wide range of asymmetries, including asymmetries in valuations and technologies, provided that players do not have private information. 2 Adding private information to perfectly-discriminating contests with asymmetric players introduces significant difficulties, of the kind inherent to asymmetric auctions. 3 Consequently, the analysis of asymmetric perfectly-discriminating contests with incomplete information is generally limited to contests with two players.
The two-player case is of considerable theoretical and applied interest, since many realworld competitions involve only two competitors. 5 To study such competitions, Amann and Leininger (1996) investigated a two-player all-pay auction with independent private values, and characterized the unique candidate for a differentiable, monotonic equilibrium. Lizzeri and Persico (2000) proved that a unique monotonic equilibrium exists in an asymmetric two-player all-pay auction with a reserve price and affiliated signals that satisfies a continuous version of the monotonicity condition I describe in Section 2. 6 Their techniques rely on the reserve price being high enough to exclude a positive measure of types from bidding, and are not suitable for the analysis of auctions without a reserve price. The current paper adds to these contributions by deriving a constructive equilibrium uniqueness result, which allows for signals that are not independent or affiliated, and does not require private or monotonic valuations or the existence of a reserve price. This expands the range of economically relevant settings that can be studied by perfectly-discriminating contests, as the research and development example above indicates. The constructive nature of the results facilitates further analysis and comparative statics, as discussed above. An additional contribution derives from the assumption that each player's set of possible signals is finite, in contrast to the typical assumption of a continuum of possible signals and atomless distributions. On a technical level, the finiteness assumption enables the use of techniques from the analysis of all-pay auctions with complete-information. These techniques rely on indifference conditions to solve for an equilibrium, instead of first-order conditions or differential equations that result from bidders' optimal behavior in typical auction models with incomplete information. 7 The analysis of such models is also complicated by technical difficulties in proving unqualified equilibrium uniqueness results (as opposed to uniqueness within the class of equilibria that are differentiable, monotone, etc.). These difficulties do not arise in the uniqueness proof given here. On a conceptual level, the finiteness assumption offers a novel connection between incomplete-and complete-information all-pay auctions. This is because the complete-information all-pay auction is a special case of the model, in contrast to its usual treatment as a limiting case of incomplete-information. The finiteness assumption also makes the equilibrium construction easy to implement as a computer program, so examples in which each player's set of possible signals is finite can be solved explicitly. 8 This may also be useful for experimental and empirical applications.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the model. Section 3 constructs the unique equilibrium. Section 4 characterizes the set of equilibria with a reserve price. Section 5 concludes with a brief discussion of special cases and comparative statics, the assumptions, directions for future research, and the equilibrium when the number of possible signals grows large. The Appendix contains the proofs of the results from Sections 3 and 4, as well as the derivation of the equilibria in Examples 1 and 2. The Online Appendix contains the proofs of the results discussed in Section 5.
Model
There are two players and one prize. Each player i = 1, 2 observes a private signal s i , which I sometimes refer to as the player's type. Player i's set of possible signals, S i , is a finite set of cardinality n i > 0. The elements in S i are ordered from high to low according to a strict ranking Â i , so s
, where −i refers to player 3 − i, and denote by f (s i |s −i ) = f (s 1 , s 2 ) /f (s −i ) the conditional probability of player i's signal s i given player (−i)'s signal s −i . The full support assumption guarantees that all conditional probabilities are well defined and positive. 9 After observing their signals, the players simultaneously choose non-negative bids and pay their bids, and the player with the higher bid wins the prize (in case of a tie, any tiebreaking rule can be used to allocate the prize between the players). Player i's valuation for the prize is V i : S i × S −i → R ++ . 10 Thus, if players' signals are s 1 and s 2 and they bid b 1 and b 2 , then player i's payoff is The input is players' valuation functions and the distribution of signals (three two-dimensional matrices) and the output is players' strategies (two vectors). 9 Throughout the paper, by positive/higher/increase etc. I mean strictly positive/higher/increase. 10 The model (and Conditions M and WM below) can be reformulated so that players' signals affect players' constant marginal costs of bidding instead of or in addition to their effect on players' valuations, as in Szech (2011) .
where
The sets S 1 and S 2 and the functions f, V 1 , V 2 , P 1 , and P 2 are commonly known.
To characterize players' equilibrium behavior, I require that from each player's point of view a higher signal is "good news" regardless of the other player's signal. With independent signals, this simply means that each player's valuation increases in his signal. However, since independence is not necessary for the equilibrium characterization, I formulate the following more general joint monotonicity condition, which clarifies the degree to which independence can be relaxed.
That is, for each player i and every signal of player −i, the product of the conditional probability of (−i)'s signal and i's valuation increases in i's signal. 11 By replacing "increases"
with "weakly increases" we obtain the following weaker monotonicity condition.
With independent signals, Condition M (WM) says that each player's valuation increases (weakly) in his own signal. With signals that are not independent, the more players' valuations increase in their own signal, the less restricted is the distribution of the signals by Conditions M and WM. For example, suppose that increasing a player's signal increases the player's valuation by a multiplicative factor of at least α > 1. Then, any signal distribution for which the same signal increase does not decrease the conditional probability of the other player's signal by a multiplicative factor of α or more satisfies Condition M. The larger is α, the less restricted is f, so players' signals need not be inde-pendent and may or may not be affiliated. This is illustrated by the following example. 12 Example 1 (Private values and correlated signals). Player 1's valuation is either 1 or 2d, and player 2's valuation is either 3 or 4d, for some fixed d ≥ 1. Each player's signal equals his valuation, 2d Â 1 1, 4d Â 2 3, f (2d, 4d) = f (1, 3) = 1/2 − ε, and f (2d, 3) = f (1, 4d) = ε, for some ε in (0, 1/2). Thus, the valuations are perfectly correlated for ε = 0, perfectly negatively correlated for ε = 1/2, statistically independent for ε = 1/4, and affiliated for ε ≤ 1/4. For i = 1, Condition M is that
Similarly, for i = 2 Condition M is that ε is in (3/ (8d + 6) , 2d/ (4d + 3)). Therefore, Condition M is satisfied for ε in (3/ (8d + 6) , 2d/ (4d + 3)), and Condition WM is satisfied
That is, the conditions are satisfied when players' valuations are not too positively or negatively correlated. In particular, the conditions may be satisfied when players' valuations are not affiliated. Note that 1/4 is in this interval, which corresponds to independent private values. As d increases, the range of values of ε for which Conditions M and WM are satisfied approaches the full range (0, 1/2).♦
Equilibrium
Denote a (mixed) strategy of player i by G i :
is the probability that player i bids at most x when his type is s i (so G i (s i , ·) is a cumulative distribution function (CDF) for every signal s i ). Abusing notation, I sometimes suppress the first argument and use G i to denote player i's ex-ante mixed strategy, so
is the ex-ante probability that player i bids at most x. Given a pair of strategies G = (G 1 , G 2 ), denote by BR i (s i ) player i's set of best responses when his type is s i and the other player plays G −i . An equilibrium is a pair of strategies G such that for i = 1, 2, G i (s i , ·) assigns measure 1 to BR i (s i ) for every signal s i .
I begin by enumerating several properties of any equilibrium. I say that a player has an atom at x if he bids x with positive probability, i.e., his CDF assigns positive probability to x for at least one signal.
Lemma 1 In any equilibrium, (i) there is no bid at which both players have an atom, (ii) there is no positive bid at which some player has an atom, (iii) if a positive bid is not a best response for some player for any of his signals, then no weakly higher bid is a best response for either player for any signal, and (iv) each player has at least one signal for which either 0 or bids arbitrarily close to 0 are best responses.
The proofs of Lemma 1 and the other lemmas in this section are in the Appendix. If higher types have higher best response sets, then we have a monotonic equilibrium.
Definition 1 An equilibrium is monotonic if for i = 1, 2 and any two signals s
The remainder of this section constructs a pair of strategies G that is the unique candidate for a monotonic equilibrium. Lemma 3 then shows that when Condition WM holds this candidate is indeed an equilibrium. Lemma 4 shows that when Condition M holds no other equilibria exist.
The following lemma characterizes players' best response sets in any monotonic equilibrium. For the formulation, recall that s 
2 ) = 0.
(1) Figure 1 depicts a configuration of players' best response sets consistent with Lemma 2, where T denotes the best response sets' common upper bound. Given the properties of players' best-response sets described in Lemma 2, which are a necessary condition for a monotonic equilibrium, G can be constructed by going from T to 0 and applying an iterative procedure, without knowing the value of T in advance.
For this, consider for some monotonic equilibrium the set of bids that consists of the lower and upper bounds of players' best response sets across all types, and call the set of intervals induced by consecutive bids in this set the joint partition. 13 In Figure 1 , the five intervals in the joint partition are depicted on the bottom line. Consider two bids 0 < x < y in the top interval of the joint partition. Both x and y are best responses for player 1 when his type is s 1 1 , and therefore lead to the same expected payoff. This expected payoff is X
The first line of (2) describes player 1's expected payoff if he bids y. The first term in this line corresponds to the event that player 2's type is lower than s 1 2 , so player 2 bids below the top interval of the joint partition and player 1 wins with probability 1. The second term corresponds to the event that player 2's type is s 1 2 , so player 2 bids in the top interval of the joint partition and player 1 wins with probability G 2 (s 1 2 , y), because y > 0 and player 2 does not have atoms above zero. Similarly, the second line of (2) describes player 1's expected payoff if he bids x.
The equality (2) can be rewritten as
. Taking y − x to 0 shows that in the top interval of the joint partition G 2 (s 1 2 , ·) is differentiable with constant density
. Similarly, because x and y are best responses for player 2 when his type is s 
. 13 Formally, the joint partition is the set of intervals [x, y] , where x and y are consecutive elements in
These densities generalize those of the unique equilibrium of the complete-information allpay auction, which are, respectively, 1/V 1 and 1/V 2 , where V i is player i's commonly-known valuation for the prize.
Having identified the densities of players' strategies in the top interval of the joint partition, we can find the length of this interval. This length L must be such that in the interval (at least) one of the two players precisely exhausts the bidding probability of his highest type, i.e., L must satisfy Lg i (s
Indeed, if the interval were longer, then the highest type of one of the players would choose bids with probability higher than 1 on this interval, which is impossible. And if the interval were shorter, then the highest type of one of the players would choose bids with probability lower than 1, because by definition of the joint partition the highest type of one of the players does not have best responses below the lower bound of the interval (in Figure 1 this is player 2). 14 To proceed with the equilibrium construction, suppose that for the top k intervals of the joint partition the densities of players' strategies and the lengths of the intervals have been computed. Suppose that in these k intervals player 1 has exhausted the bidding probability of his 0 ≤ k 1 < n 1 highest types and player 2 has exhausted the bidding probability of his 0 ≤ k 2 < n 2 highest types. Then, there are at least k + 1 intervals in the joint partition. 15 And in the (k + 1) st interval (from the top) type s
of player 1 and type s
of player 14 If this player had an atom at the lower bound of the interval, then part (ii) of Lemma 1 would imply that the lower bound is 0; but then both players would have atoms there in order to exhaust their remaining bidding probability, which part (i) of Lemma 1 rules out. 15 Otherwise, by (1) the lower bound of the union of these intervals is 0, so both players would have atoms there in order to exhaust their remaining bidding probability, which part (i) of Lemma 1 rules out.
2 are the ones with best responses. 16 The equivalent of (2) for this interval is thus X
and similarly for player 2, which leads to constant densities
¢ and (3)
, s
Similarly to the top interval, the length of the (k + 1) st interval is the minimal length required for some player i to exhaust the (remaining) bidding probability of his type s
when players' densities are given by (3) . (Note that by definition of the joint partition at most one player i will have expended any bidding probability of type s
This iterative process stops when some player i exhausts the bidding probability of his lowest type, s n i i . The bid at which this happens must be 0.
17 Any remaining bidding probability of player −i must therefore be expended as an atom at 0. This atom may include the bidding probabilities of several types. Because the length of each interval of the joint partition is known at this point, by going upward from 0 the lower and upper bounds of each interval can be identified. The value of T is the sum of the lengths of these intervals. This completes the construction, which produces the only pair of strategies G consistent with a monotonic equilibrium. The following lemma shows that if Condition WM holds G is indeed an equilibrium, because Condition WM implies that every type of each player chooses best responses with probability 1. 16 If a higher type is the one with best responses in this interval, then because he does not bid there (he has exhausted his bidding probability on higher intervals), no type of the player bids there. Therefore, bids in this interval are not best responses for any type of the other player, contradicting the structure implies by Lemma 2. And if a lower type of player i has best responses in this interval, then type s
chooses bids with probability lower than 1, because his best responses are on higher intervals and he has not exhausted his bidding probability by bidding there. 17 Otherwise, there would be an interval with lower bound 0 in which player i does not bid, so positive bids in this interval would not be best responses for any type of the other player, contradicting the structure implied by Lemma 2.
Lemma 3 If Condition WM holds, then G is an equilibrium.
The following lemma shows that when Condition M holds any equilibrium is monotonic.
Lemma 4 If Condition M holds, then any equilibrium is monotonic.
The main result of the paper is the following proposition, which is an immediate implication of Lemmas 3 and 4 and the fact that the construction produces the unique candidate for a monotonic equilibrium.
Proposition 1 If Condition WM holds, then the construction produces an equilibrium. If condition M holds, then this is the unique equilibrium.
Applying the construction to the contest in Example 1, we obtain the outcome depicted in Figure 2 (the details of the construction are in the Appendix). This outcome is the unique equilibrium for ε in (3/ (8d + 6) , 2d/ (4d + 3)), because for these values of ε Example 1 shows that Condition M holds. Example 2 (Condition WM holds and Condition M fails). Player 1's valuation is known to be 1, and player 2's valuation is 1 or 2 with equal probabilities. Player 2's valuation, however, is known only to player 1. That is, player 1's signal is equal to player 2's valuation, f (1) = f (2) = 1/2, and player 2 has only one signal, s 2 . Condition WM is satisfied (and Condition M fails) for i = 1, regardless of whether 2 Â 1 1 or 1 Â 1 2, because f (s 2 |1) = f (s 2 |2) = 1 and V 1 (1, s 2 ) = V 1 (2, s 2 ) = 1. Condition WM is trivially satisfied for i = 2, because player 2 has only one signal.
Applying the construction to the rankings 1 Â 1 2 and 2 Â 1 1 results in two different equilibria, which are depicted in the top part of Figure 3 (the details of the construction are in the Appendix). A third equilibrium is one in which player 1 ignores his signal, so the players compete as in the complete-information all-pay auction in which player 1's valuation is 1 and player 2's valuation is 3/2. This equilibrium is depicted in the bottom part of Figure 3 . Note that the equilibria differ from an ex-ante perspective. In the equilibrium that corresponds to 2 Â 1 1, player 1 bids 0 with probability 1/2 (with probability 1 when his signal is 1), in the equilibrium that corresponds to 1 Â 1 2 player 1 bids 0 with probability 1/4 (with probability 1/2 when his signal is 2), and in the third equilibrium player 1 bids 0 with probability 1/3 (regardless of his signal). Perturbing the contest slightly so that player 1's valuation depends on his signal leads to a unique equilibrium, because Condition M then holds for one of the rankings: 2 Â 1 1 if player 1's valuation is higher when his signal is 2, and 1 Â 1 2 if player 1's valuation is higher when his signal is 1.♦
Equilibrium with a Reserve Price
Suppose that Condition M holds and a reserve price r > 0 is introduced. The reserve price corresponds to a minimum investment necessary to win the contest. A player who bids less than r loses, regardless of what the other player bids. I begin with an overview of the resulting equilibria, which are described in Proposition 2 below.
If r is high enough, then in equilibrium players bid only 0 or r. If r is not too high, then an equilibrium consists of two regions. Among the bids up to r, players bid only 0 or r, and at most one player bids r. Above r, much of the previous analysis applies: for each player's type that bids above r, the set of best responses above r is an interval, these intervals are higher for higher types, and the union of these intervals for each player across his types is also an interval.
This shows that an equilibrium with a reserve price can be obtained by identifying a bid b ≤ r, such that players' equilibrium bidding behavior above r is a "right shift" of their bidding behavior above b in the equilibrium without a reserve price. Bids below b without a reserve price correspond to bids of 0 or r with a reserve price. The bottom part of Figure 4 depicts an equilibrium configuration consistent with the introduction of a not-too-high reserve price to the contest whose equilibrium configuration without a reserve price is depicted in the top part of Figure 4 . The bid b is unique: it is the highest bid such that in the equilibrium without a reserve price, for at least one player the gross winnings (excluding the cost of the bid) at that bid of the type for whom the bid is a best response are no higher than r. Indeed, if b were lower, then for at least one player the gross winning of the type for whom the bid is a best response without a reserve price would be lower than r, so he would not be willing to bid slightly above r, as required by the equilibrium (see the bottom part of Figure 4 ). If b were higher, then the gross winnings of the types of both players for whom the bid is a best response without a reserve price would be higher than r. But then neither would be willing to bid 0, which would imply they both have an atom at r, a contradiction. Even though b is unique (and easy to identify), there may be multiple equilibria. These equilibria differ only in the probabilities that the players bid 0 or r. In addition, all equilibria are payoff equivalent.
I now describe players' equilibrium strategies formally. Denote by
2 ) the unique equilibrium of the contest with a reserve price of 0, i.e., without a reserve price. For a bid x in (0, T 0 ], where T 0 is the common supremum of players' best responses in G 0 , denote by s i (x) player i's (lowest) type for which x is a best response in G 0 . 18 Denote by Denote by v 
Moreover, any equilibrium of the contest is such a pair G r for some i for which b i = b and some p in [0, 1]. All equilibria are payoff equivalent. 18 The bid x is a best response for two types of player i only if x is an endpoint of the best response set of some type of player i.
19 b i is well defined because s i (·) is left continuous. 20 If
Proposition 2 shows that multiple equilibria may exist. This occurs when b i = b and v 0 −i (s −i , b) = r, which happens for at most one type s −i of player −i (because of Condition M). The equilibria differ only in the probabilities with which that particular type bids 0 and r. Therefore, when the probability of each type is small (so the number of types is large), the difference between any two equilibria is small. 21 This observation is consistent with Lizzeri and Persico's (2000) result that with a continuum of types, each of which occurs with probability 0, and a sufficiently high reserve price there is a unique equilibrium. 22 Their result does not apply when there is no reserve price, or when the reserve price is low. In contrast, Proposition 2 characterizes the set of equilibria for any reserve price.
Conclusion
This paper has investigated an asymmetric two-player all-pay auction. The novel features are a finite number of signals for each player, an asymmetric signal distribution, interdependent valuations, and a non-restricted reserve price. If a monotonicity condition holds, then without a reserve price there is a unique equilibrium, which can be constructed by a simple procedure. With a reserve price, all equilibria are payoff equivalent and differ in the bidding behavior of at most one type for each player. In many special cases the equilibrium characterization can be used to derive comparative statics and answer various questions about the value of information. It is straightforward, for example, to derive a closed-form characterization for any fixed number of possible signals for each player. 23 A closed-form characterization can also be derived when players have private values, one player's valuation is known to be higher than the other's, and only one player has private information. When the privately-informed player is the one with the higher valuation, his low types enjoy a higher payoff increase relative to the corresponding complete-information contest than do his high types. A first-order stochastic dominance (FOSD) shift in his type distribution increases his expected payoff and causes the other player to bid less aggressively, in a FOSD sense. When the privately-informed player is the one with the lower valuation, his high types enjoy a weakly higher payoff increase relative to the corresponding complete-information contest than do his low types. A FOSD shift in his type distribution may increase or decrease his payoff, and decreases the other player's payoff. When the value of the prize is common to both players, their equilibrium bid distributions are identical from an ex-ante perspective.
24 Players' payoffs may differ, however, because each player can condition his bid on his private information, which may differ between the players. A closed form solution can be derived if, in addition to common values, only one player has private information. If this player becomes more informed, in that his new distribution is a mean-preserving spread of his previous distribution, then both players bid less aggressively in a FOSD sense. This decreases overall expenditures and increases the informed player's payoff. These results are derived in the Online Appendix. One direction for future research is to use the characterization to derive similar results for additional special cases of economic interest. Another direction is to embed the model in multistage games in which investments or information acquisition precede the contest. A third direction is to relate the equilibrium as the number of possible signals grows large to the corresponding (and yet unsolved) model with a continuum of signals. The special case of independent private values was considered by Amann and Leininger (1996) . The Online Appendix shows that their unique candidate for a differentiable, monotonic equilibrium can be derived as the limit of a sequence of equilibria that correspond to contests with independent private values and an increasingly large but finite number of possible signals. 25 Finally, it would be valuable to extend the analysis to more than two players and to nonmonotonic equilibria. To illustrate why this is not straightforward, I conclude with a short discussion of the two-player assumption and the monotonicity condition.
More than two players. The two-player assumption guarantees that both players bid on the same interval [0, T ] and the equilibrium densities at any bid, given by (3), depend only on the types for which the bid is a best response, and not on the bid itself. 26 This property allows the construction to proceed from the highest bid T downward, without knowing in advance what T is. 27 With more than two players, a player need not bid on an interval, and different players may bid in different regions. The techniques developed in this paper are insufficient to determine which players bid in each region and the bidding 24 This is reminiscent of Engelbrecht-Wiggans, Milgrom, and Weber's (1983) result, who showed this property for the equilibrium of a common-value first-price auction in which only one bidder is informed about the value of the object. 25 Contat (2013) generalizes this observation. 26 This property also depends on each player having a constant marginal cost of bidding. 27 A similar property enables the equilibrium construction of Bulow and Levin (2006) . densities in regions in which more than two players bid. Non-monotonic equilibria. The monotonicity condition guarantees that the outcome of the construction is indeed an equilibrium and, moreover, that it is the unique equilibrium. When the monotonicity condition fails, it may be that no equilibrium is monotonic for any ranking of players' signals. To see this, consider the setting of Example 1. When ε = 0 there is a unique equilibrium, which is not monotonic: player 1's best response set is [0, 1] when his valuation is 1 and [0, 2d] when his valuation is 2d, and player 2's best response set is (0, 1] when his valuation is 3 and (0, 2d] when his valuation is 4d. This is because ε = 0 implies full correlation of players' signals, so players bid as in the complete information all-pay auction that corresponds to their valuations. Characterizing the set of equilibria when the monotonicity condition fails likely requires a different approach from the one presented here, because it is then not clear how to pin down the best response set of each type.
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Appendix

Proof of Lemma 1
For (i), suppose that type s 1 of player 1 and type s 2 of player 2 bid x with positive probability, and suppose that player i does not win this tie with probability 1. Because f (s −i |s i ) is positive, type s i of player i could obtain a higher payoff by bidding slightly more than x, so x is not a best response for him, a contradiction.
For (ii), suppose that type s i of player i bids x > 0 with positive probability. Similarly to (i), no type of the other player would have best responses on some positive-length interval with upper bound x. But then type s i of player i could do strictly better by bidding slightly less than x, so x is not a best response for him, a contradiction.
For (iii), note that (ii) proves that each player's CDF is continuous above 0 for any of his types. Therefore, if a bid x > 0 is not a best response for any type of a player, the same is true for all bids in a non-trivial maximal neighborhood of x, so the player does not bid there. This implies that all bids in this neighborhood are not best responses for the other player, so he also does not bid there. But then, again by continuity, the upper bound of this neighborhood is not a best response for any type of either player (only an atom at the top of the neighborhood could make a player willing to bid there), so this neighborhood is unbounded from above.
For (iv), suppose that 0 is not a best response for one of the players and that player does not have best responses arbitrarily close to 0. This means that the player does not have best responses in some interval with lower bound 0. By (iii), the player does not have any best-responses, so we do not have an equilibrium.
Proof of Lemma 2
Because the equilibrium is monotonic, part (iii) of Lemma 1 shows that BR i (s i ) is an interval and sup
is impossible, because the equilibrium is monotonic. Parts (i), (iii), and (iv) of Lemma 1 imply (1). Note that the best-response set of every type is relatively closed in R ++ , because by part (ii) of Lemma 1 each player's CDF is continuous above 0.
Proof of Lemma 3
Suppose that players choose bids according to G. To show that G is an equilibrium, it suffices to show that every type of each player chooses best responses with probability 1. For some player i, let 0 = l
T be the set of bids such that type s k i of player i chooses bids from the interval
(This set of bids is a subset of the endpoints of the intervals in the joint partition.) and for every other signal s −i we have
is a CDF and x > y. Therefore, because s Figure 2 In the top interval, players' high types compete, so we have
Construction of the CDFs in
, and the length of the interval is (1 − 2ε) 2d. In this interval player 2 exhausts the bidding probability of his high type, and player 1 expends ((1 − 2ε) 2d) / ((1 − 2ε) 4d) = 1/2 of the bidding probability of his high type. In the next interval, player 1's high type and player 2's low type compete, so we have
Given these densities, player 1 exhausts the remaining bidding probability of his high type on an interval of length (1/2) / (1/6ε) = 3ε, and player 2 exhausts the bidding probability of his low type on an interval of length 4εd. Therefore, the length of the interval is 3ε. In this interval player 1 exhausts the remaining bidding probability of his high type, and player 2 expends 3ε/ (4εd) = 3/ (4d) of the bidding probability of his low type. In the next interval, players' low types compete, so we have
Given these densities, player 1 exhausts the bidding probability of his low type on an interval of length 3−6ε, and player 2 exhausts the remaining bidding probability of his low type on an interval of length (1 − 3/(4d)) / (1/ (1 − 2ε)) = (1 − 2ε) (4d − 3) /(4d). Therefore, the length of the interval is (1 − 2ε) (4d − 3) /(4d). In this interval player 2 exhausts the remaining bidding probability of his low type, and player 1 expends (4d − 3) /(12d) of the bidding probability of his low type. Because player 2 exhausts the bidding probability of his low type, the lower bound of the interval is 0, and player 1 expends the remaining bidding probability of (8d + 3) /(12d) of his low type as an atom at 0. The sum of the lengths of the three intervals is
7.6 Construction of the CDFs in Figure 3 For the ranking 2 Â 1 1, in the top interval player 1's type 2 competes against player 2 (who has only one type, s 2 ), so we have
and the length of the interval is 1. In this interval, player 1 exhausts the bidding probability of his type 2, and player 2 exhausts his bidding probability. Therefore, the lower bound of the interval is 0, and player 1 expends the bidding probability of his type 1 as an atom at 0. Therefore, T = 1.
For the ranking 1 Â 1 2, in the top interval player 1's type 1 competes against player 2, so we have
and the length of the interval is 1/2. In this interval, player 1 exhausts the bidding probability of his type 1, and player 2 expends 1/2 of his bidding probability. In the next interval, player 1's type 2 competes against player 2, so players' densities are given by (6) . Given these densities, player 2 exhausts his remaining bidding probability on an interval of length 1/2, and player 1 exhausts the bidding probability of his type 2 on an interval of length 1. Therefore, the length of the interval is 1/2. In this interval, player 2 exhausts his remaining bidding probability, and player 1 expends 1/2 of the bidding probability of his type 2. Therefore, the lower bound of the interval is 0, and player 1 expends the remaining bidding probability of 1/2 of his type 2 as an atom at 0. The sum of the lengths of the two intervals is T = 1/2 + 1/2 = 1.
Proof of Proposition 2
Consider an equilibrium of the contest with a reserve price and denote it by G r . Denote by BR This implies that the construction described in Section 3 applies to bids in (r, T r ], where T r is the common supremum in (iv) above. Therefore, above r any equilibrium coincides with the equilibrium without a reserve price starting from some bid, that is, for i = 1, 2, any signal s i of player i, and every x ≥ r, G s i (y) (player i's lowest type for which y is a best response in G 0 ) obtains a positive payoff by bidding slightly more than r. This implies that the payoffs in G r of types s 1 (y) and s 2 (y) are positive. And because G r (s 1 (y) , r) = G 0 (s 1 (y) , y) > 0 (where the inequality follows from y > 0 and the definition of s 1 (y)) and, similarly, G r (s 2 (y) , r) > 0, types s 1 (y) and s 2 (y) each have an atom at 0 and/or r. But because at most one player has an atom at r (as in part (i) of Lemma 1), either type s 1 (y) or type s 2 (y) (or both) have an atom at 0, leading to a payoff of 0 in G r , a contradiction. This pins down players' equilibrium behavior above r. For i = 1, 2 and any signal s i , type s i of player i chooses bids in {0, r} with probability G Since at most one player has an atom at r, if player −i bids r with positive probability, then G r is a pair of strategies as specified in the statement of the proposition (type s −i of player −i can bid both 0 and r with positive probability only if his payoff of bidding r is 0, i.e., v 0 −i (s −i , b) = r). And if player i bids r with positive probability, then b −i = b. This is because b −i < b implies that type s −i (b) of player −i can obtain a positive payoff by bidding slightly more than r, but because at most one player has an atom at r, type s −i (b) of player −i must bid 0 (and get 0) with probability G 0 −i (s −i (b) , b) > 0, a contradiction. Therefore, in this case G r is a pair of strategies as specified in the statement of the proposition, with −i instead of i.
Finally, the arguments above show that all the pairs of strategies specified in the statement of the proposition are equilibria and are payoff equivalent.
